Recommendations
Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Consistency and its converse: an introduction
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
- Efficient priority rules
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with transfers
- On monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
Cited in
(31)- Consistency in house allocation problems
- On the consistency of random serial dictatorship
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs
- Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- Overlapping multiple object assignments
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
- Efficient priority rules
- House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- House allocation problems with existing tenants and priorities for teacher recruitment
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
- House allocation with fractional endowments
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Packaging for allocation
- Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money
- Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
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