Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082115 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
(27)- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
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- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
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