A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
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Publication:682480
DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0984-XzbMATH Open1392.91125OpenAlexW2483260075MaRDI QIDQ682480FDOQ682480
Authors: Keisuke Bando, Kenzo Imamura
Publication date: 2 February 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0984-x
Recommendations
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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