A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods

DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0984-xzbMath1392.91125OpenAlexW2483260075MaRDI QIDQ682480

Kenzo Imamura, Keisuke Bando

Publication date: 2 February 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0984-x

zbMATH Keywords

weak Maskin monotonicityallocation of indivisible goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems

Cites Work

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