A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
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- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
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