Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.02.012MaRDI QIDQ423715zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Salvador Barberà

Publication date 4 June 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.012

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitystrategy-proofnessintertwined domainsreshuffling invariance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 477584 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Voting by Committees

Cited in

(8)

• Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
• On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
• Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
• Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
• A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
• Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
• A decomposition of strategy-proofness
• The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness

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