Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
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Publication:423715
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.02.012zbMATH Open1239.91047OpenAlexW2016672095MaRDI QIDQ423715FDOQ423715
Authors: Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.012
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- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
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- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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- Voting by Committees
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- Implementability via protective equilibria
Cited In (8)
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
- The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness
- On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
- Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
- A decomposition of strategy-proofness
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
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