The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness

DOI10.1007/S10058-020-00236-1MaRDI QIDQ2218554zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuta Nakamura

Publication date 15 January 2021

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00236-1

zbMATH Keywords

distributiondomain restrictionpivotal mechanismno disposal of utilityno free ride

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains

Cited in

(1)

• Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains

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