The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness

DOI10.1007/S10058-020-00236-1zbMATH Open1455.91068OpenAlexW3044481178MaRDI QIDQ2218554FDOQ2218554

Authors: Yuta Nakamura 

Publication date: 15 January 2021

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00236-1

Recommendations

• Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
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• Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism

zbMATH Keywords

distributiondomain restrictionpivotal mechanismno disposal of utilityno free ride

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains

Cited In (1)

• Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains

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