Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
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Publication:2334836
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.07.002zbMATH Open1426.91089OpenAlexW2966068505WikidataQ127434566 ScholiaQ127434566MaRDI QIDQ2334836FDOQ2334836
Authors: Yuta Nakamura 
Publication date: 8 November 2019
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.07.002
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Cites Work
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Optimal Auction Design
- Incentives in Teams
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
- Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
Cited In (4)
- The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness
- On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design
- Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
- Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
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