Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
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Cites work
- Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Incentives in Teams
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
- Optimal Auction Design
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
Cited in
(4)- Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
- The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness
- Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
- On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design
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