On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.009zbMath1202.91071OpenAlexW1983577354MaRDI QIDQ2268126

Juan Carlos Carbajal

Publication date: 10 March 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.009

zbMATH Keywords

value functionprivate informationGroves mechanismscollective decision makingdominant strategy mechanismspayoff equivalence principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces ⋮ The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness ⋮ Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Change of variables for absolutely continuous functions
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

This page was built for publication: On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle