On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
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Publication:2268126
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.009zbMath1202.91071OpenAlexW1983577354MaRDI QIDQ2268126
Publication date: 10 March 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.009
value functionprivate informationGroves mechanismscollective decision makingdominant strategy mechanismspayoff equivalence principle
Related Items (3)
Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces ⋮ The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness ⋮ Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
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