On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.09.009MaRDI QIDQ2268126zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan Carlos Carbajal

Publication date 10 March 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.009

zbMATH Keywords

collective decision makingdominant strategy mechanismsGroves mechanismspayoff equivalence principleprivate informationvalue function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

This paper establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness of Groves mechanisms among efficient, dominant strategy mechanisms in a social choice setting with quasi linear preferences, private valuations and arbitrary sets of alternatives, This condition, which imposes a restriction on the behavior of the one-sided directional derivatives of the valuation functions with respect to individual types, is also shown to be sufficient and necessary to obtain the payoff equivalence principle for dominant strategy mechanisms whose choice rules are affine maximizers. Potential applications include models with uncountable sets of social alternatives, e.g., public goods provision problems and auction design with divisible objects.

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Cited in

(9)

• A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
• The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness
• Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
• Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
• Undominated Groves mechanisms
• On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
• A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
• Characterizing implementability via weak monotonicity on unit demand valuation domains

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