A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1300686
DOI10.1007/s001990050286zbMath0942.91063OpenAlexW3124992979WikidataQ59885198 ScholiaQ59885198MaRDI QIDQ1300686
Publication date: 10 May 2000
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050286
Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (49)
Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Optimal market thickness ⋮ Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms ⋮ A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights ⋮ Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ The modified Vickrey double auction ⋮ Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition ⋮ Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control ⋮ Internet auctions with many traders ⋮ Bargaining mechanisms for one-way games ⋮ Universal possibility and impossibility results ⋮ Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions ⋮ A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism ⋮ Mechanism design for land acquisition ⋮ Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments ⋮ When Walras meets Vickrey ⋮ Trade of a common value good ⋮ On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism ⋮ Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements ⋮ Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games ⋮ Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently ⋮ Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments ⋮ Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival ⋮ Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach ⋮ Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions ⋮ Asymmetric partnerships ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ Second best efficiency and the English auction ⋮ Seller competition by mechanism design ⋮ Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Dissolving (in)effective partnerships ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Design and analysis of mechanisms for decentralized joint replenishment ⋮ Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade ⋮ When queueing is better than push and shove ⋮ The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism ⋮ Ex post efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction when demand can be arbitrarily larger than supply ⋮ Multibidding game under uncertainty ⋮ On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle ⋮ Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions ⋮ Public goods with congestion ⋮ A general non-central hypergeometric distribution ⋮ On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms ⋮ The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap ⋮ Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability ⋮ Assembly Problems
This page was built for publication: A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
