Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2358563
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.12.008zbMath1395.91218OpenAlexW2589923262MaRDI QIDQ2358563
Rudolf Müller, Juan Carlos Carbajal
Publication date: 15 June 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.12.008
public goodsmulti-unit auctions2-cycle monotonicityrevenue equivalencemonotonic transformations in differencessingle-peaked domains
Cites Work
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
- Extremal incentive compatible transfers
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
- Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
- Monotonicity and Implementability
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
- A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
- On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
- Optimal Auction Design
- Differential Topology
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Contracting with Externalities
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
This page was built for publication: Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences