Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.12.008MaRDI QIDQ2358563zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan Carlos Carbajal, Rudolf Müller

Publication date 15 June 2017

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.12.008

zbMATH Keywords

2-cycle monotonicitymonotonic transformations in differencesmulti-unit auctionspublic goodsrevenue equivalencesingle-peaked domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Contracting with Externalities
• Differential Topology
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Extremal incentive compatible transfers
• Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
• Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
• Monotonicity and implementability
• Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
• Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(3)

• Monotonicity in mechanism design (abstract)
• Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
• Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences

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