Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.06.002MaRDI QIDQ406380zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Debasis Mishra, Anup Pramanik, Souvik Roy

Publication date 8 September 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

implementation2-cycle monotonicityrevenue equivalencesingle-peakedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Extremal incentive compatible transfers
• Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
• Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
• Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
• Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
• Monotonicity and implementability
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
• Optimal Auction Design
• Single-peaked orders on a tree
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility

Cited in

(16)

• Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
• Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces
• The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
• The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
• Local incentive compatibility with transfers
• Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
• Ideal default for resolving disputes efficiently
• Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty
• Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
• Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
• Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces
• Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
• Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
• Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
• Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains

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