Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
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Publication:406380
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.06.002zbMATH Open1309.91071OpenAlexW2077440772MaRDI QIDQ406380FDOQ406380
Debasis Mishra, Souvik Roy, Anup Pramanik
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.002
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Cites Work
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- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Extremal incentive compatible transfers
- Optimal Auction Design
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- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
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- Monotonicity and Implementability
- Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
- Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
- Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
Cited In (9)
- Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
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