An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms

DOI10.1145/2213977.2214021zbMath1286.91052OpenAlexW2100292679MaRDI QIDQ5415495

S. Matthew Weinberg, Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis

Publication date: 13 May 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2213977.2214021

zbMATH Keywords

optimal mechanism designBorder's theoremmultidimensional mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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