Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms
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Publication:5108230
DOI10.1287/moor.2018.0958zbMath1437.91212OpenAlexW2947550808WikidataQ127759927 ScholiaQ127759927MaRDI QIDQ5108230
Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Hu Fu
Publication date: 30 April 2020
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0958
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (5)
Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies ⋮ Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives ⋮ A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer ⋮ Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents ⋮ Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
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