The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
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Publication:1581188
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2639zbMath0998.91017OpenAlexW2739947352MaRDI QIDQ1581188
Publication date: 24 November 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2639
Related Items (42)
Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers ⋮ Income inequality and endogenous market structure under directed search ⋮ THE EFFECT OF FINANCING ON A BUDGET-CONSTRAINED SUPPLY CHAIN UNDER WHOLESALE PRICE CONTRACT ⋮ Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions ⋮ Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints ⋮ Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions ⋮ Selling less information for more: garbling with benefits ⋮ Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result ⋮ Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents ⋮ Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility ⋮ Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach ⋮ A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer ⋮ Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints in auctions ⋮ Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms ⋮ Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines ⋮ Joint logistics and financial services by a 3PL firm ⋮ Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers ⋮ Money and price posting under private information ⋮ Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment ⋮ Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer ⋮ Portfolio procurement policies for budget-constrained supply chains with option contracts and external financing ⋮ Search, money, and inflation under private information ⋮ Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion ⋮ The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints ⋮ Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information ⋮ Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization ⋮ High bids and broke winners ⋮ Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers ⋮ Nonlinear pricing with budget constraint ⋮ Optimal financing and operational decisions of capital-constrained manufacturer under green credit and subsidy ⋮ Mechanism design with partial state verifiability ⋮ Optimal sales mechanism with outside options ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction ⋮ Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders ⋮ Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints ⋮ Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach ⋮ Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions ⋮ Two-stage contests with budget constraints: an experimental study ⋮ Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
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