Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.03.002zbMATH Open1437.91264OpenAlexW3012739994MaRDI QIDQ2178586FDOQ2178586

Authors Guillaume Carlier, Kelvin Shuangjian Zhang

Publication date 11 May 2020

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.06552

zbMATH Keywords

coercivitybudget constraintpartial participationprincipal-agent problems with adverse selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43)

Abstract: We prove an existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider a more general coercivity condition which takes into account the principal's cost and the agents' preferences. Our existence proof is simple and flexible enough to adapt to partial participation models as well as to the case of type-dependent budget constraints.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(8)

• Existence in multidimensional screening with general nonlinear preferences
• Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
• A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection
• A duality and free boundary approach to adverse selection
• Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal-agent problems
• Bounds on Choquet risk measures in finite product spaces with ambiguous marginals
• The mathematics of principal-agent problem with adverse selection
• Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions

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