Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
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Publication:1317328
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1071zbMath0790.90021MaRDI QIDQ1317328
Claudio Mezzetti, Gary Biglaiser
Publication date: 24 March 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1071
91B14: Social choice
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