Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
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Publication:1317328
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1071zbMath0790.90021OpenAlexW1964663511MaRDI QIDQ1317328
Claudio Mezzetti, Gary Biglaiser
Publication date: 24 March 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1071
Related Items (8)
Principal-Agent Problem with Common Agency Without Communication ⋮ Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models ⋮ Principal–Agent Theory, Game Theory, and the Precautionary Principle ⋮ Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword ⋮ Pre-sale information ⋮ Participation constraints in adverse selection models ⋮ A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information. ⋮ Agency in a market setting
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