A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00286-6MaRDI QIDQ1584824zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rudolf Vetschera

Publication date 2000

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(99)00286-6

zbMATH Keywords

Decision theoryOrganizationPrincipal-agent models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Multicriteria agency theory
• The value of preference information in agency relationships
• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
• Uncertain agency models with multi-dimensional incomplete information based on confidence level
• Principal and expert agent

Cites work

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Cited in

(10)

• Learning about preferences in electronic negotiations - A volume-based measurement method
• Multiscale decision-making: bridging organizational scales in systems with distributed decision-makers
• Uncertain agency models with multi-dimensional incomplete information based on confidence level
• The value of preference information in agency relationships
• Unifying temporal and organizational scales in multiscale decision-making
• Multicriteria agency theory
• Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: an experimental study
• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
• A computer simulation and analysis to the principal agent model
• The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures

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