Principal and expert agent
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Recommendations
Cited in
(26)- A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
- Uncertainty, risk, and the efficiencies of the principal and the agent: a chance constrained data envelopment analysis approach
- Impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts under different information structures
- The use of an agent in a signalling model
- On the role of commitment in a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal
- A difficulty in the testing of strategic experts
- Collaborative product development: managing supplier incentives for key component testing
- Consulting collusive experts
- Motivating informed decisions
- Pessimistic information gathering
- Flexible contracts
- Robust incentives for information acquisition
- Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
- Subjective evaluation versus public information
- Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
- The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
- Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation
- Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent
- Information projection: model and applications
- Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: an experimental study
- Principal-agent models
- Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
- Principal-agent contracts based on sentiment of money manager
- Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
- Restrictions and agent selection
- Common agency with risk-averse agent
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