Motivating informed decisions

DOI10.1007/S00199-017-1087-3MaRDI QIDQ2323607zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andres Zambrano

Publication date 3 September 2019

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1087-3

zbMATH Keywords

CEO compensationcontractinformation acquisitionprivate information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Principal and expert agent
• Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• Robust incentives for information acquisition
• Incentive contracting with hidden choices of effort and risk

Cites work

• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Learning and information aggregation in an exit game
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
• Preemption Games with Private Information
• Principal and expert agent
• Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry
• Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems
• The Theory of Decision Procedures for Distributions with Monotone Likelihood Ratio

Cited in

(12)

• `Nudging' risky decision-making: the causal influence of information order
• Strategic experimentation with asymmetric players
• The simple economics of white elephants
• Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information
• Transparency, career concerns, and incentives for acquiring expertise
• Project assignment rights and incentives for eliciting ideas
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• Principal and expert agent
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1779930 (Why is no real title available?)
• Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
• Delegation to incentivize information production
• Options can induce risk taking for arbitrary preferences

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