Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry

DOI10.1007/PL00004192MaRDI QIDQ5953038zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Hellwig

Publication date 2 July 2003

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004192

zbMATH Keywords

debt contractsrisk sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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