Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
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- Expected utility versus the changes in knowledge ahead
- Capital accumulation under different financial agreements
- Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
- Communication, commitment, and growth
- Financial market frictions, monetary policy, and capital accumulation in a small open economy
- Real business cycles, investment finance, and multiple equilibria
- A simple model of spatial banking competition
- Destroying the ``pretending equilibria in the Demski-Sappington-Spiller model
- Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
- The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification
- Optimal multilateral contracts
- Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
- Firm behaviour under the threat of liquidation
- Capital market imperfections, international credit markets, and nonconvergence
- Financial contracting with enforcement externalities
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Optimal monetary policy with capital and a financial accelerator
- Investment, agency conflicts, debt maturity, and loan guarantees by negotiation
- Security design with interim public information
- Capacity decisions with debt financing: the effects of agency problem
- Communicating subjective evaluations
- Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle
- A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions
- Default and efficient debt markets.
- First-best debt relief
- A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization
- Optimal debt contracts and the single-crossing condition
- Monetary policy, bank leverage, and financial stability
- Costly external finance and labor market dynamics
- Verifying the state of financing constraints: evidence from U.S. business credit contracts
- Agency problems in public-private partnerships investment projects
- Asset holdings, information aggregation in secondary markets and credit cycles
- Interbank borrowing and lending between financially constrained banks
- Birds of a feather: separating spillovers from shocks in sovereign default
- Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
- Financial conditions and supply decisions when firms are risk averse
- Vigilant measures of risk and the demand for contingent claims
- Negative agency costs
- Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification
- The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity
- Debt, equity, and information
- Existence of unsolicited ratings
- Default and aggregate income
- Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example
- Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
- Investment timing, debt structure, and financing constraints
- Firm asset structure and risk aversion
- Markets for financial innovation
- The optimal financing of a conglomerate firm with hidden information and costly state verification
- Subjective evaluation versus public information
- Credit contracts, moral hazard, and the role of credit securities
- Design of bank credit contract with punishment mechanism
- Unproductive investment and rent extraction
- Reducing the debt: is it optimal to outsource an investment?
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
- A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles
- Debt and Development
- Firm heterogeneity, credit constraints, and endogenous growth
- Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition
- Credit risk in general equilibrium
- A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
- Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch
- International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
- Being Credit Rationed: Delay and Transaction Cost
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2204533 (Why is no real title available?)
- The nature of credit-market failure
- Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry
- Default risks, interest rate spreads, and business cycles: Explaining the interest rate spread as a leading indicator
- On the firm-level implications of the bank lending channel of monetary policy
- Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
- Capital requirements and growth in an open economy
- Relational enforcement
- Financial dollarization in emerging markets: an insurance arrangement
- Optimal banking with delegated monitoring
- Delegated recruitment and statistical discrimination
- Optimal job assignment with spillover effects
- Bank competition, financial stability and welfare: does the objective function of competitors matter?
- The role of risky debt and safe assets in unregulated financial intermediaries with costly state verification
- Banking and banking reforms in China in a model of costly state verification
- The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation
- Algorithmic contract theory: a survey
- Endogenous dispersion and volatility in stock returns
- Fearing the worst: the importance of uncertainty for inequality
- The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Optimal debt contracts and product market competition with exit and entry
- The price of size and financial market allocations
- Financial liberalization in a small open economy
- The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs
- Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
- An introduction to general equilibrium with incomplete asset markets
- Optimal contracts
- Bankruptcy and firm finance
- Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models
- Credit market frictions and their direct effects on U.S. Manufacturing fluctuations
- Risk sharing, risk shifting and the role of convertible debt
- Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement
- Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
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