Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0274-zzbMath1147.91020MaRDI QIDQ934897

Ludovic Renou

Publication date: 30 July 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0274-z

zbMATH Keywords

Equilibrium; Monitoring; Costly state verification; Direct lending; Financial intermediation; Multi-lender coalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B52: Special types of economic equilibria

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Financial intermediary-coalitions
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