Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
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Publication:3691370
DOI10.2307/2297737zbMath0573.90020OpenAlexW2140281938MaRDI QIDQ3691370
Martin F. Hellwig, Douglas Gale
Publication date: 1985
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d4dda9a0d378bd2923c5ee090f1f4e8f6e68f65a
asymmetric informationlendingsecond-bestborrowingfirst-bestimplicit contract modelsincentive-compatible debt contracts
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