Security design with interim public information
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Publication:1748378
Recommendations
Cites work
- A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design
- Adverse Selection and Convertible Bonds
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Liquid bundles
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design
- Why banks should keep secrets
Cited in
(10)- Private information and the design of securities
- Security design without verifiable retention
- Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
- Security Design in Initial Public Offerings*
- Optimal tranching with diverse beliefs
- Security Design, Insider Monitoring, and Financial Market Equilibrium
- Optimality of debt under flexible information acquisition
- Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design
- Dynamic asset-backed security design
- Security design in non-exclusive markets with asymmetric information
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