Security design with interim public information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1748378
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.02.005zbMath1388.91142OpenAlexW3121204032MaRDI QIDQ1748378
Publication date: 9 May 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.02.005
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Cites Work
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Liquid bundles
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Why banks should keep secrets
- Adverse Selection and Convertible Bonds
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
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