Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3328199
DOI10.2307/2297430zbMATH Open0539.90006OpenAlexW2108491286MaRDI QIDQ3328199FDOQ3328199
Authors: Douglas Diamond 
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2d760b373cd8eaeea25d7f352b92139ded85abd6
Recommendations
financeportfoliodiversificationfinancial intermediationincentive problemscapital structure of intermediaries
Cited In (92)
- Credit market frictions and their direct effects on U.S. Manufacturing fluctuations
- Risk sharing, risk shifting and the role of convertible debt
- Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: the role of collusive threats
- Optimal capital structure and project financing
- Consumer default with complete markets: default-based pricing and finite punishment
- Risk disclosure and firm operational efficiency
- A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization
- Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
- The efficiency effects of a single market for financial services in Europe.
- Scarce collateral, the term premium, and quantitative easing
- How does debt structure influence stock price crash risk?
- Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement
- Bank capital, fire sales, and the social value of deposits
- A continuous-time optimal insurance design with costly monitoring
- Optimal monetary policy with interest on reserves and capital over-accumulation
- A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure
- International financial contagion and the fund-A theoretical framework
- Default and aggregate income
- Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
- Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
- Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
- Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation
- Explaining the nonlinear effects of financial development on economic growth
- On the firm-level implications of the bank lending channel of monetary policy
- Robust optimal risk sharing and risk premia in expanding pools
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Fearing the worst: the importance of uncertainty for inequality
- A simple model of spatial banking competition
- Financial markets in development, and the development of financial markets
- Credit risk in general equilibrium
- Banks, relative performance, and sequential contagion
- Understanding liquidity shortages during severe economic downturns
- The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts
- The development and structure of financial systems
- Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties
- Liquidity management with decreasing returns to scale and secured credit line
- Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
- The role of bank capital in the propagation of shocks
- Monetary policy, bank leverage, and financial stability
- Capital accumulation under different financial agreements
- Entrepreneurship and government subsidies: a general equilibrium analysis.
- Financial intermediary-coalitions
- Optimal design of bank regulation under aggregate risk
- Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
- Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
- Debt, equity, and information
- Banking, incentive constraints, and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns
- A model of financial fragility
- Excessive risk taking and the maturity structure of debt
- Redistribution as a selection device
- Financial Surveillance
- Reinsurance or securitization: the case of natural catastrophe risk
- Ordinary shares and managers
- Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch
- Savings and default
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment
- The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification
- Introduction to financial economics
- Loanable Funds, Monitoring and Banking *
- Bank's capital structure under non-diversifiable risk
- Financial intermediation in an overlapping generations model with transaction costs
- A POST KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE ON COMMERCIAL BANK BEHAVIOR AND REGULATION
- The threshold effects of income diversification on bank stability: an efficiency perspective based on a dynamic network slacks-based measure model
- Welfare implications of bank capital requirements under dynamic default decisions
- Informational hold up and intermediaries
- A general equilibrium theory of banks' capital structure
- Debt contracts, banks, and aggregate liquidity
- Security design with interim public information
- Mandatory disclosure tone and bank risk-taking: evidence from Europe
- Influencer marketing and product competition
- On the money creation approach to banking
- Loan commitments, asymmetric information and capital regulation: an explanation for the synergy or narrow-banking management
- Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
- Optimal crowdfunding design
- The supply chain effect of monitoring cost
- Remarks on “Financial Services Integration: Right for some, Wrong for Others?”
- When Many Wrongs Make a Right
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The paradox of safe asset creation
- Deposit insurance and reinsurance
- Enter the MATRIX model:a multi-agent model for transition risks with application to energy shocks
- Rising bank concentration
- Optimal debt contracts and the single-crossing condition
- The optimal financing of a conglomerate firm with hidden information and costly state verification
- Optimal banking with delegated monitoring
- On the welfare equivalence of asset markets and banking in Diamond Dybvig economies
- Monetary conditions and banks' behaviour in the Czech Republic
- Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Financial stability, liquidity risk and income diversification: evidence from European banks using the CAMELS-DEA approach
- Interbank borrowing and lending between financially constrained banks
This page was built for publication: Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3328199)
