On the welfare equivalence of asset markets and banking in Diamond Dybvig economies

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.09.023MaRDI QIDQ2453029zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexander Zimper

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/61/WP/wp_2013_56.zp39433.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asset marketasymmetric informationdemand deposit contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• When are banks better than markets? Comment on Zimper (2013)
• Asset price volatility and banks
• Optimal Diamond-Dybvig mechanism in large economies with aggregate uncertainty
• Banking, incentive constraints, and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns
• Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility

Cites work

• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Existence of independent random matching
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables

Cited in

(4)

• When are banks better than markets? Comment on Zimper (2013)
• Banks versus markets. A response to Kucinskas
• Optimal Diamond-Dybvig mechanism in large economies with aggregate uncertainty
• Suspension of Convertibility versus Deposit Insurance: A Welfare Comparison

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