Recommendations
- Disputes, debt, and equity
- Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement
- Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
- Endogenous Managerial Incentives and the Optimal Combination of Debt and Dividend Commitments
- A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence
Cites work
- A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
- A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence
- Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
- Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors
Cited in
(8)- Disputes, debt, and equity
- Dividends as a signalling mechanism: the case of illiquid stock markets
- The use of equity financing in debt renegotiation
- Asymmetric information and the pecking (dis)order
- Endogenous Managerial Incentives and the Optimal Combination of Debt and Dividend Commitments
- A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Screening and financial contracting in the face of outside competition
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