Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
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Cited in
(42)- The price of size and financial market allocations
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1434021 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
- A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization
- Capital flow freezes
- Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
- Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency
- Entrepreneurs, legal institutions and firm dynamics
- Financial contracting under imperfect enforcement
- Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement
- Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition
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- Expropriation and foreign direct investment in a positive economic theory of foreign aid
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- A tractable model of limited enforcement and the life-cycle dynamics of firms
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- Monetary policy, bank leverage, and financial stability
- Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
- On controlling the maintenance of durable goods when contractual enforcement is costly
- Efficient contract enforcement
- Breach of Contract
- Legal enforcement, default and heterogeneity of project-financing contracts
- Debt, equity, and information
- Endogenous dispersion and volatility in stock returns
- Contracting in the presence of judicial agency
- Computing general equilibrium models with occupational choice and financial frictions
- Legal environment and contractual choice
- Choices in contractivity theory
- Optimal banking with delegated monitoring
- Bankruptcy and firm finance
- Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification
- Do lack of transparency and enforcement undermine international risk-sharing?
- The non-neutrality of debt in investment timing: a new NPV rule
- Interbank borrowing and lending between financially constrained banks
- The role of risky debt and safe assets in unregulated financial intermediaries with costly state verification
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