Communicating subjective evaluations
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Cites work
- A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
- Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
- Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- Leadership Style and Incentives
- Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
Cited in
(6)- Information revelation in relational contracts
- Subjective evaluation versus public information
- Subjective performance and the value of blind evaluation
- Stretching the truth: Elastic justification and motivated communication of uncertain information
- The economics of excuses: job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests
- The bonding cost in subjective performance evaluation
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