A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems

DOI10.3982/TE2008zbMath1396.91086MaRDI QIDQ4682752

René Kirkegaard

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic ordersfirst-order approachmoral hazardprincipal-agent modelsmulti-taskingorthant orders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (12)

Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems ⋮ The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ A dual approach to agency problems ⋮ A general solution method for moral hazard problems ⋮ Tournament rewards and heavy tails ⋮ Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard ⋮ The informativeness principle without the first-order approach ⋮ Local incentive compatibility with transfers ⋮ Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach ⋮ Communicating subjective evaluations ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach ⋮ Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function

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