Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
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Publication:893411
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.003zbMath1369.91113MaRDI QIDQ893411
Publication date: 19 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.003
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