Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.09.003zbMATH Open1369.91113OpenAlexW2144774507MaRDI QIDQ893411FDOQ893411

Authors: Jin Yong Jung, Son Ku Kim 

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.003

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zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachprincipal-agent modellikelihood ratio variable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Remarks on a Multivariate Transformation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
• The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money

Cited In (16)

• A dual approach to agency problems
• Relational contracts and the first-order approach
• A general solution method for moral hazard problems
• Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
• Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
• The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
• An information inequality for agency problems
• Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach
• A new class of sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to the principal-agent problem
• Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies
• The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
• Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach

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