On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment

DOI10.1007/S10058-007-0025-4zbMATH Open1274.91272OpenAlexW2013468984MaRDI QIDQ2462897FDOQ2462897

Authors: Sandrine Ollier 

Publication date: 5 December 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0025-4

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zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachlimited liabilitygeneralized agency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints
• Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
• Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models

Cited In (15)

• The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions.
• The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
• A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
• Conditional Analysis and a Principal-Agent Problem
• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
• A general solution method for moral hazard problems
• An information inequality for agency problems
• The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
• The principal-agent problem for service rate event-dependency
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model?
• Distributions for the validity of the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
• Characterizing optimal wages in principal-agent problems without using the first-order approach
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach

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