Optimal contracting of separable production technologies

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0561MaRDI QIDQ1378012zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter S. Faynzilberg, Praveen Kumar

Publication date 5 February 1998

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0561

zbMATH Keywords

risk-averse agentrisk-neutral principalagency problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3714012 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3626409 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3798532 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Choosing Workers' Qualifications: No Experience Necessary?
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Statistical mechanics of choice: MaxEnt estimation of population heterogeneity
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

Cited in

(7)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2146627 (Why is no real title available?)
• On contractual approach for non-convex production economies
• Contracting over multiple parameters: capacity allocation in semiconductor manufacturing
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
• On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment
• What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model?

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