The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4290977
DOI10.2307/2951619zbMath0798.90020OpenAlexW2077908095MaRDI QIDQ4290977
Publication date: 5 May 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951619
Related Items (21)
An envelope approach to tournament design ⋮ Relational contracts and the first-order approach ⋮ On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard ⋮ A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem ⋮ Optimal contracting of separable production technologies ⋮ Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems ⋮ On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach ⋮ Globally convergent homotopy method for designing piecewise linear deterministic contractual function ⋮ A general solution method for moral hazard problems ⋮ INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS ⋮ Correlation and relative performance evaluation ⋮ Common shocks and relative compensation ⋮ The informativeness principle without the first-order approach ⋮ Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach ⋮ A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems ⋮ Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach ⋮ Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard ⋮ Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography ⋮ Globally convergent homotopy algorithm for solving the KKT systems to the principal-agent bilevel programming
This page was built for publication: The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
