The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
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Publication:4290977
DOI10.2307/2951619zbMath0798.90020MaRDI QIDQ4290977
Publication date: 5 May 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951619
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