The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems

DOI10.2307/2951619zbMATH Open0798.90020OpenAlexW2077908095MaRDI QIDQ4290977FDOQ4290977

Authors: Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne 

Publication date: 5 May 1994

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951619

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zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent problemsmulti-dimensional signal spacestochastic dominance condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Cited In (28)

• The first-order approach to the principal-agent problems under inequality aversion
• An envelope approach to tournament design
• Relational contracts and the first-order approach
• Globally convergent homotopy method for designing piecewise linear deterministic contractual function
• Ranking of signals in multitask agency models
• Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
• A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
• Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach
• A general solution method for moral hazard problems
• Globally convergent homotopy algorithm for solving the KKT systems to the principal-agent bilevel programming
• On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard
• Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
• Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography
• A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem
• Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function
• Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
• The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Distributions for the validity of the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
• Correlation and relative performance evaluation
• Common shocks and relative compensation
• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach

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