On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard

DOI10.1007/S10058-007-0021-8zbMATH Open1159.91421OpenAlexW1967625305MaRDI QIDQ2644693FDOQ2644693

Authors: Gustavo E. Rodriguez 

Publication date: 3 September 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0021-8

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zbMATH Keywords

value of informationmoral hazardprincipal-agent model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
• A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (3)

• The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
• Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
• On the value of information sharing in the presence of information errors

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