A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(00)00055-0MaRDI QIDQ5931982zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aloisio Araujo, Humberto Moreira

Publication date 17 July 2001

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(00)00055-0

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachgeneral Lagrangianmoral hazard problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029228 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226089 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1022519 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3437452 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3281211 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model

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(11)

• An envelope approach to tournament design
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
• A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
• The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
• A general solution method for moral hazard problems
• On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard
• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
• Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable?
• Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
• Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach

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