A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5931982
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(00)00055-0zbMATH Open0970.91050OpenAlexW2139639096MaRDI QIDQ5931982FDOQ5931982
Aloisio Araujo, Humberto Moreira
Publication date: 17 July 2001
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(00)00055-0
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
Cited In (9)
- An envelope approach to tournament design
- Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach
- A general solution method for moral hazard problems
- On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard
- Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
- A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
- Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable?
- The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
- Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
This page was built for publication: A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5931982)