An envelope approach to tournament design

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.11.004MaRDI QIDQ268598zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christian Ewerhart

Publication date 15 April 2016

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

envelope theoremfirst-order approachrank-order tournaments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
• A polynomial optimization approach to principal-agent problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029228 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194779 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 46153 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information in tournaments under limited liability
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Rank-order tournaments and selection.
• Risk taking in selection contests
• The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• The nature of tournaments
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems

Cited in

(14)

• Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry
• A collective tournament
• Properties of ladder tournaments
• On the optimality of small research tournaments
• Tournament rewards and heavy tails
• Large tournament games
• Designing Multiperson Tournaments with Asymmetric Contestants: An Experimental Study
• The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments
• A simulation comparison of tournament designs for the World Men's Handball Championships
• Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns
• Multiple prizes for multiple tasks: externalities and the optimal design of tournaments
• Seniority bias in a tournament
• Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
• Information in tournaments under limited liability

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