An envelope approach to tournament design
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Publication:268598
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.11.004zbMath1368.91122OpenAlexW2106153574MaRDI QIDQ268598
Publication date: 15 April 2016
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.11.004
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Cites Work
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- The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments
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- The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
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- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
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