The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
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Publication:4262860
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00075zbMATH Open0958.91027OpenAlexW2117044887MaRDI QIDQ4262860FDOQ4262860
Authors: James Mirrlees 
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00075
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- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Approximating stationary points of stochastic mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints via sample averaging
- Regulation of a risk averse firm
- The moral hazard problem with high stakes
- Systemic Risk and Security Management
- Moral hazard, risk seeking, and free riding
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- A general solution method for moral hazard problems
- Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
- Convexification method for bilevel programs with a nonconvex Follower's problem
- Pareto improving taxes
- Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography
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- Optimal contracts in portfolio delegation
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- Approximated set-valued mapping approach for handling multiobjective bilevel problems
- A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem
- Stochastic Programming Perspective on the Agency Problems Under Uncertainty
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- Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
- Quantitative stability analysis for distributionally robust optimization with moment constraints
- Branch-and-sandwich: a deterministic global optimization algorithm for optimistic bilevel programming problems. I: theoretical development
- Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
- The bilevel programming problem: reformulations, constraint qualifications and optimality conditions
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- The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
- An information inequality for agency problems
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- On the optimal taxation of capital income
- A smoothing augmented Lagrangian method for solving simple bilevel programs
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- Global efficiency for multiobjective bilevel programming problems under generalized invexity
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- MPEC Methods for Bilevel Optimization Problems
- Optimal contracts to a principal-agent model with a diffusion coefficient affected by firm size
- Discrete approximation and convergence analysis for a class of decision-dependent two-stage stochastic linear programs
- All-units discounts and double moral hazard
- Principal-multiagents problem under equivalent changes of measure: general study and an existence result
- Bilevel Optimization: Reformulation and First Optimality Conditions
- A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
- Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities
- Mixed-integer bilevel representability
- Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function
- Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
- Difference of convex algorithms for bilevel programs with applications in hyperparameter selection
- Imperfect information, monitoring cost and incentives in the agency problem
- A general framework for robust contracting models
- Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
- Pareto-improving tax reforms and the earned income tax credit
- First-order penalty methods for bilevel optimization
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