The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I

Cited In (84)

Endogenous criteria for success
Generic Property of the Partial Calmness Condition for Bilevel Programming Problems
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Robust reinsurance contracts with risk constraint
Constraint Qualifications and Optimality Conditions in Bilevel Optimization
A Lagrange Multiplier Expression Method for Bilevel Polynomial Optimization
Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach
MPEC Methods for Bilevel Optimization Problems
Optimal contracts to a principal-agent model with a diffusion coefficient affected by firm size
Discrete approximation and convergence analysis for a class of decision-dependent two-stage stochastic linear programs
All-units discounts and double moral hazard
Principal-multiagents problem under equivalent changes of measure: general study and an existence result
Bilevel Optimization: Reformulation and First Optimality Conditions
Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities
Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
Difference of convex algorithms for bilevel programs with applications in hyperparameter selection
Imperfect information, monitoring cost and incentives in the agency problem
A general framework for robust contracting models
Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
Pareto-improving tax reforms and the earned income tax credit
First-order penalty methods for bilevel optimization
Solution of bilevel optimization problems using the KKT approach
Moral hazard with bounded payments
On the solution of convex bilevel optimization problems
On solving simple bilevel programs with a nonconvex lower level program
Strive to be first or avoid being last: an experiment on relative performance incentives
Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach
An envelope approach to tournament design
Relational contracts and the first-order approach
Is bilevel programming a special case of a mathematical program with complementarity constraints?
Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement
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Globally convergent homotopy method for designing piecewise linear deterministic contractual function
Relaxed constant positive linear dependence constraint qualification and its application to bilevel programs
Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
Approximating stationary points of stochastic mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints via sample averaging
Regulation of a risk averse firm
The moral hazard problem with high stakes
Systemic Risk and Security Management
Moral hazard, risk seeking, and free riding
Optimal auctions with information acquisition
A general solution method for moral hazard problems
Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
Convexification method for bilevel programs with a nonconvex Follower's problem
Pareto improving taxes
Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography
Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
Optimal contracts in portfolio delegation
Bilevel Polynomial Programs and Semidefinite Relaxation Methods
Approximated set-valued mapping approach for handling multiobjective bilevel problems
A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem
Stochastic Programming Perspective on the Agency Problems Under Uncertainty
Title not available (Why is that?)
Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
Quantitative stability analysis for distributionally robust optimization with moment constraints
Branch-and-sandwich: a deterministic global optimization algorithm for optimistic bilevel programming problems. I: theoretical development
Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
The bilevel programming problem: reformulations, constraint qualifications and optimality conditions
BOLIB: Bilevel Optimization LIBrary of Test Problems
The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
An information inequality for agency problems
On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
On the optimal taxation of capital income
A smoothing augmented Lagrangian method for solving simple bilevel programs
On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility
Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
Mixed-integer bilevel representability
Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function
A new class of sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to the principal-agent problem
Smoothing SQP Methods for Solving Degenerate Nonsmooth Constrained Optimization Problems with Applications to Bilevel Programs
Smoothing augmented Lagrangian method for nonsmooth constrained optimization problems
Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures
A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems
A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
Incentive contracting with hidden choices of effort and risk
Global efficiency for multiobjective bilevel programming problems under generalized invexity
Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents
Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach

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