The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00075zbMath0958.91027OpenAlexW2117044887MaRDI QIDQ4262860

James Mirrlees

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00075

zbMATH Keywords

utilitymoral hazardprincipal-agent modelsunobservable behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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I: theoretical development ⋮ Is bilevel programming a special case of a mathematical program with complementarity constraints? ⋮ Smoothing augmented Lagrangian method for nonsmooth constrained optimization problems ⋮ On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility ⋮ A Lagrange Multiplier Expression Method for Bilevel Polynomial Optimization ⋮ Global efficiency for multiobjective bilevel programming problems under generalized invexity ⋮ Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach ⋮ Moral hazard with bounded payments ⋮ Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement ⋮ Approximating stationary points of stochastic mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints via sample averaging ⋮ Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion ⋮ Convexification method for bilevel programs with a nonconvex Follower's problem ⋮ Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability ⋮ Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation ⋮ A smoothing augmented Lagrangian method for solving simple bilevel programs ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach ⋮ Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices ⋮ Quantitative Stability Analysis for Distributionally Robust Optimization with Moment Constraints ⋮ Regulation of a risk averse firm ⋮ Solution of bilevel optimization problems using the KKT approach ⋮ Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function ⋮ Optimal auctions with information acquisition ⋮ Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems ⋮ Imperfect information, monitoring cost and incentives in the agency problem ⋮ Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures ⋮ Smoothing SQP Methods for Solving Degenerate Nonsmooth Constrained Optimization Problems with Applications to Bilevel Programs ⋮ Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard ⋮ Constraint Qualifications and Optimality Conditions in Bilevel Optimization ⋮ MPEC Methods for Bilevel Optimization Problems ⋮ BOLIB: Bilevel Optimization LIBrary of Test Problems ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography ⋮ Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions ⋮ On the solution of convex bilevel optimization problems

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