Endogenous criteria for success

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105760MaRDI QIDQ6139980zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors René Kirkegaard

Publication date 19 January 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardprincipal-agent models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Multicriteria agency theory
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An analytically solvable principal-agent model
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts

Cites work

• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• The no-upward-crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral-hazard problem

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