Endogenous criteria for success
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6139980
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105760MaRDI QIDQ6139980
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Moral hazard with bounded payments
- Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
- Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
- Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
- Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology
- The no‐upward‐crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral‐hazard problem
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