An analytically solvable principal-agent model

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.002zbMath1519.91159OpenAlexW4323670076MaRDI QIDQ6102563

Joergen W. Weibull, Lars-Göran Mattsson

Publication date: 23 June 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardprincipal-agentKullback-LeiblerLegendreoptimal contracthidden actiondebt contractf-divergence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

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• Identification With Additively Separable Heterogeneity
• Convex Analysis
• On Information and Sufficiency
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• Optimal technology design

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