Optimal technology design

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105621zbMath1518.91116MaRDI QIDQ6163287

Alex Smolin, Daniel F. Garrett, Balázs Szentes, George Georgiadis

Publication date: 9 June 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://repository.essex.ac.uk/34998/1/Technology_Design_Merged.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

contract theorymoral hazardlimited liability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (1)

An analytically solvable principal-agent model

Cites Work

• Robust monopoly pricing
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
• Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard
• Payoff implications of incentive contracting
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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