Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
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Publication:4833989
DOI10.2307/2951698zbMath0827.90040OpenAlexW1980877408MaRDI QIDQ4833989
Publication date: 23 May 1995
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp608.pdf
Related Items (21)
The effect of better information on income inequality ⋮ Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies ⋮ Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems ⋮ Endogenous criteria for success ⋮ A dual approach to agency problems ⋮ Comparing information in general monotone decision problems ⋮ Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance ⋮ Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship ⋮ All-or-nothing payments ⋮ INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS ⋮ Information and the dispersion of posterior expectations ⋮ Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts ⋮ The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case ⋮ The informativeness principle without the first-order approach ⋮ Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship ⋮ Communicating subjective evaluations ⋮ Ranking of signals in multitask agency models ⋮ Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology ⋮ Information in tournaments under limited liability ⋮ Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard ⋮ Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions
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