Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.11.008zbMATH Open1268.91101OpenAlexW3123022311MaRDI QIDQ356592FDOQ356592

Authors: Francois Larmande 

Publication date: 26 July 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.11.008

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zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachmoral hazardlikelihood ratio distributionlimited liabilitymean preserving spread criterion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model

Cited In (1)

• Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition

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