Ranking agencies under moral hazard

DOI10.1007/S001990050181MaRDI QIDQ1381089zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Edward Henry Robbins, Bharat Sarath

Publication date 15 March 1998

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050181

zbMATH Keywords

first degree stochastic dominanceprincipal-agentranking outputs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Social choice (91B14)

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(5)

• Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies
• Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
• Ranking of signals in multitask agency models
• The virtue of being underestimated: A note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
• The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case

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