The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
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Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
- Contracts with endogenous information
- A general principal-agent setting with non-differentiable mechanisms: Some examples
- The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
- Job challenge as a motivator in a principal-agent setting
- Monotone second-best optimal contracts
- Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
- Optimal incentives and asymmetric distribution of information
- Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts
- The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
- Duopoly signal jamming
- Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
- Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts
- Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
- Ranking agencies under moral hazard
- Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty
- The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions.
- Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
- A continuous-time optimal insurance design with costly monitoring
- Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments
- A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem
- A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
- The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
- Communicating subjective evaluations
- Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
- Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
- Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
- Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard
- The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money
- Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
- Wealth effects and agency costs
- Ad valorem versus per unit taxation: a perspective from price signaling
- Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability
- Salesforce contracting under model uncertainty
- Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function
- Principal-agent problem under the linear contract
- Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
- On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
- The moral hazard problem with high stakes
- Tournament rewards and heavy tails
- Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property
- Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection
- The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
- Optimal liquidation rule and debt in the principal-agent model
- On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
- Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
- Globally convergent homotopy method for designing piecewise linear deterministic contractual function
- Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
- The first-order approach to the principal-agent problems under inequality aversion
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
- On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment
- Time of the essence
- Growth volatility and technical progress: a simple rent-seeking model
- Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
- On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard
- An envelope approach to tournament design
- Relational contracts and the first-order approach
- Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance
- Characterizing optimal wages in principal-agent problems without using the first-order approach
- Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
- Distributions for the validity of the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
- Conditional Analysis and a Principal-Agent Problem
- Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
- A general solution method for moral hazard problems
- Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
- On the validity of the first-order approach with moral hazard and hidden assets
- Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach
- Bilevel optimization: theory, algorithms, applications and a bibliography
- Optimal Dynamic Reinsurance Under Heterogeneous Beliefs and CARA Utility
- Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond
- Effort Observability and Wage Promotion in an Internal Labor Market
- Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
- Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
- Globally convergent homotopy algorithm for solving the KKT systems to the principal-agent bilevel programming
- Incentive and quality assurance: an agency theoretical perspective
- Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
- The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments
- Ranking of signals in multitask agency models
- A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
- Access pricing and exclusionary behavior
- What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model?
- Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
- Participation in moral hazard problems
- Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
- Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model
- The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
- Endogenous criteria for success
- A dual approach to agency problems
- Optimal technology design
- Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
- Moral hazard in loss reduction and state-dependent utility
- On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
- Pareto-improving tax reforms and the earned income tax credit
- Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives
- Optimal allocations in growth models with private information
- Principal-multiagents problem under equivalent changes of measure: general study and an existence result
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation
- Shaking the tree: an agency-theoretic model of asset pricing
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