Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105527MaRDI QIDQ2095253zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jin Yong Jung

Publication date 9 November 2022

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105527

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardwealth effectsagent preferencesagency costincentive cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3281211 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
• Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal-agent problems
• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• Risk aversion, moral hazard and the principal's loss.
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
• Wealth effects and agency costs
• Wealth effects in the principal agent model

Cited in

(2)

• The employment contract when the firm can utilize a free resource
• Quantifying the social welfare loss in moral hazard models

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