Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.08.004MaRDI QIDQ2437832zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date 13 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesinduced effortminimum paymentsmoral hazardproductivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Wealth effects in the principal agent model

Cited in

(6)

• The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model
• Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability
• Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
• The moral hazard problem with high stakes
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• Moral hazard with bounded payments

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