Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability
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Publication:2058508
Recommendations
- Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
- Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
- Moral hazard with bounded payments
- Optimal contract, imperfect output observation, and limited liability
- Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining
Cites work
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
- Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
- Moral hazard with bounded payments
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Cited in
(9)- Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems
- Optimal contract, imperfect output observation, and limited liability
- Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
- Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
- On the existence of share contracts under limited liability
- Optimal Group Size in Joint Liability Contracts
- Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard
- Robust contracting under double moral hazard
- Double moral hayard, monitoring and the nature of contracts
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