Optimal Group Size in Joint Liability Contracts
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Cites work
Cited in
(9)- Joint liability among bank borrowers
- Optimal group size in microlending
- Selection into and across credit contracts: theory and field research
- Contract structure, risk-sharing, and investment choice
- Asymmetric group loans, non-assortative matching and adverse selection
- Group lending, matching patterns, and the mystery of microcredit: evidence from Thailand
- The role of completely joint liability in financing multiple capital-constrained firms: risk sharing, inventory and financial strategies
- Group lending as a mechanism for self-insuring default risk
- Group survival probability under contagion in microlending
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