Optimal collusion with limited liability

DOI10.1111/J.1742-7363.2013.12015.XMaRDI QIDQ4583981zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Etienne Billette De Villemeur, Laurent Flochel, Bruno Versaevel

Publication date 29 August 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38481/1/MPRA_paper_38481.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collusionlimited liabilityoligopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cited in

(13)

• On the feasibility of maximal collusion
• Liquidation risks in the Rotemberg-Saloner implicit collusion model
• Collusion under financial constraints: Collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one?
• Sustaining collusion in markets with entry driven by balanced growth
• The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy
• Is capital a collusion device?
• Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels
• Optimal Group Size in Joint Liability Contracts
• Marginal costs and collusive sustainability
• Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: An example
• Collusion with capacity constraints under a sales maximization rationing rule
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model

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