Is capital a collusion device?

DOI10.1007/S00199-001-0249-4MaRDI QIDQ1865169zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Switgard Feuerstein, Hans Gersbach

Publication date 25 March 2003

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0249-4

zbMATH Keywords

collusionCournot competitiongrim strategyirreversible capitalvalue of commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

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(4)

• Cartel size and collusive stability with non-capitalistic players
• Optimal collusion with limited liability
• Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
• Sustaining collusion in markets with entry driven by balanced growth

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